Clash of two organised sides Compact defense as a result of the coordinated press In Atletico’s first line of their early third build up, there were two center halves as the first agent of ball distribution. When both full backs stayed close to the center half duo, the 6 duo would go narrow but slighly higher than the full backs’ line. But, when the full backs went higher up the pitch, which occurred in most of Atletico’s build up, the 6-duo dropped deeper with one of them staying as the central six and the other occupied the ball side half space or, at times, stayed in the same line with Savic and Diego Godin, Atletico’s center halves. Against this, Bilbao came up with a 4-4-2 basic shape. The first line of their press occupied Atletico’s central 6 but slightly deeper as they looked to contain Atletico progression through the central 6. If the 9 duo stepped forward toward the opponent’s center halves, then the task to contain Atletico’s 6 would be taken by the nearest central midfieder. When Atletico played the ball to the wing or to the one in the half space, Bilbao’s near wide man would step up toward the receiver. Sometimes, the said wide man failed to press the receiver and it allowed Atletico to gain the space to play a diagonal pass to the deeper striker who dropped to the space between Bilbao’s central midfielder. Here the individual defensive awareness and the compact shape, in general, often managed to close the space and prevented Atletico from generating more valuable attacking actions. When they lost the shape for a while, Bilbao’s pressing block was also still able to recover quickly. For example, when the 9 duo parted too far away horizontally and Atletico’s back line managed to access Thomas Partey at the 6, Bilbao’s 9 was still able to react quickly by moving toward Partey. This was also supported by the middle-line as they narrowed the shape and shortened the horizontal gap within the line. As expected, Atletico lost the progression chance and were forced to play it back. Sometimes, it occurred that Bilbao overloaded the second line with 5 players, which consisted of the 8 duo, two-full backs, and an inverted winger. But when the circulation came into the wide area, Bilbao would leave two players to stay on the far side with two or three players staying on the strong side. In this situation, Atletico started to establish a stronger overload than the hosts. Why? Because they only needed to deal with three players of Bilbao. If then Bilbao developed the wide dynamic by using two of nearest players (as one player stayed in the center), Atletico would make it even more simple for them to gain the numerical superiority. Atletico capitalized their principle In the second half, Atletico performed better – Koke’s movement to the center area of the playing block often helped them to create a strong local overload for strong ball circulation against Bilbao’s narrow block. On the other hand, this also often created space in the wide area for Atletico to create progression access. Apart from the goal and particularly after the first one, Simeone made a basic formation change. He played a dynamic 4-5-1. Griezmann and Carrasco on the wing, Correa in the 9 space, and Koke, Saul, and Partey in the central midfield. This made it even harder for Bilbao as Atletico played with three central midfielders which meant there was stronger coverage in the central area as well as improved width. With better width and more presence in the central area, Atletico found the more comfortable condition in playing their typical highly-narrow structured possession. For full version of the analysis you're welcome to read it on http://outsideoftheboot.com/2017/09/22/tactical-analysis-athletic-bilbao-1-2-atletico-madrid/ Thanks for reading. You can find me on Twitter @ryantank100